

COMMUNIQUE

Of the report from the Independent national Commission charged of collecting elements of evidence of the role of France in the 1994 genocide of Tutsi submitted on November 16, 2007, the Rwandan Government retains the following facts and considerations.

Between October 1990 and August 1994, France supported the administration of President Habyarimana in the commission of acts of genocide between October 1990 and March 1993, in perpetration of genocide itself between April and July 1994, and later, in the violent destabilization of Rwanda coming from Zaire. The support of France was of political, military, diplomatic and logistic nature. There is no indication of any attempt on behalf of French political and military decision makers to use of their influence in order to end the plan of extermination of civil Tutsis beginning in October 1990. The persistence, determination, abundant character of the French support to the Rwandan policy of massacres; various methods of direct French participation in the aggression of civil Tutsis because of their ethnic membership show the complicity of the French political and military leaders in preparation and execution of the 1994 Tutsi genocide.

France knew about preparations of genocide

From October 1990, France knew about the possibility that the Habyarimana administration could commit genocide. Later, she knew about preparations of massacres of great extent.

During the period from October 1990 up to April 1994, French officers were present in all the Rwandan security organs. From 1991, until at least December 1993, there were many French advisers in the Rwandan armed Forces (*FAR*), gendarmerie, criminal documentation and Research center (CRCD), the gendarmerie investigation organ, as well as in almost all the specialized units among which was the presidential guard. French military advisers were at all the institutional levels, in the general -staff, the units of elite and in each operational sector next to the battlefield frontline. In the general -staff, they took part in work meetings and often took the direction in the development of the strategies, established plans of battles and security in particular of Kigali. In military operational sectors, they conducted battle activities of the *FAR*. Until April 1994, there were French advisers in the army and gendarmerie general-staff like in the *Paracommando* battalion, one of those which were implied in triggering the genocide. Thus, French officers not only found themselves almost everywhere in security units of the country, but they also exercised first key responsibilities. According to the General Dallaire, the day before the genocide, because of their presence in the structures of management of the *FAR*, the French soldiers “*were completely informed that there was a plan of something which could lead to great massacres*”^[1].

France took part in the principal initiatives of preparation of genocide

Ideological complicity. At the political and ideological level, France consolidated the Habyarimana administration in elaborating its genocide ideology. In their internal communication, diplomatic telegrams, memorandums and other documents, various French officials in charge of the Rwandan case between 1990 and 1993 state their radically ethnic option of the Rwandan conflict. For these officials, and initially President Mitterrand, it was initially and above all an ethnic, regionalized war, opposing the Hutu majority and “nilo-hamitic”, Tutsi minority. On June 22nd, 1994, President Mitterrand makes the following statement justifying insidiously the genocide in progress in the Cabinet meeting: “ *The President of the Republic points out that Rwanda, like Burundi, is primarily populated by Hutus. The majority of the population thus naturally supported the government of President Habyarimana. If this country was to pass under the domination of a very minority tutsi group having its base in Uganda where some are favorable to the creation of a “Tutsiland” including not only this last country but also Rwanda and Burundi, it is certain that the process of democratization would be interrupted* »^[2] As of October 1990, France aligned itself on the most radically ethnicist vision of the conflict of the extremists and supported them. Thus, towards the end of the process of negotiations of the Arusha peace agreements, one of the principal cornerstones of obstacle had been the refusal of the FPR and part of the internal opposition Hutu to include the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic in the broad based transitional government (GTBE) which was to come out of the Peace agreements. The French diplomats made pressure so that this openly racist party and already calling at the time for the massacre of Tutsis and moderate opponents be included.

Induction with the creation of the Hutu-power coalition, political base of the genocide. On February 28, 1993, the French Minister for Cooperation and Development, Marcel Debarge, went to Kigali. During his visit, he pressed opposition political parties to “ *to make common front* »^[3] with president Habyarimana against FPR. Rwandan political actors of that time as well as observers heard by the Commission made a precise interpretation of this call from Debarge, cited here by the French historian Gerard Prunier: « *Even if it is understandable that Paris wishes to exploit the strengthening of Hutu sides against the RPF tutsi, the official declaration of the French minister is shocking. In such a climate of ethnic tension, after these last weeks massacres, this call to a “common front”, inevitably based on the race, is almost a call to the racial war* »^[4]. The Belgian journalist Colette Braeckman, present in Rwanda at that time, reported to the Commission that while pretending supporting the process of Arusha, “ *in private, French diplomats praise themselves to have divided the opposition parties in encouraging the birth of the Hutu power.* »^[5] However the creation of the Hutu-power coalition was a condition necessary to the successful execution of the genocide.

Offering open support to the Rwandan National Army (FAR), even though the army was greatly inclined to commit genocide. France supported the national army in every possible way, they organised them, trained them and even armed them. France also actively participated in the war and several times fought side by side with the Rwandan National Army: In October 1990, in January 1991, in June 1992 and in February 1993; the army also had plans to commit genocide since there was a section of the civilian population who were considered as enemies, and they executed the plans when the military police and members of the presidential guard killed civilians in Bugesera in 1992. The French army manned road blocks in different parts of the country, particularly in Kigali, where they checked individual identity cards with the purpose of checking for the ethnicity of those who crossed the road blocks and stopped those whose identity cards indicated that they were Tutsi. Some of those who were identified as Tutsi were killed and tortured in the presence of members of the French army who also participated in those acts of murder and torture.

Planning and initiating the civil defence program, a program that turned out to be a mechanism for executing Genocide. Officers of the French army in Rwanda played an active role in the preparation and planning of the civil defence program which was supposed to be an avenue for the execution of the Genocide. One can note that, that was the program aimed at military training and giving arms to civilians, a program which was headed by leaders of the local administration. It was the very program that enabled the widespread of the Genocide which was overseen by the Interim Government. The program differs from the interahamwe organisation even though it was the basis of its creation. In his final report after investigating the armies that were on the frontline in February 1991, Lieutenant- Colonel Gilbert Canovas advised members of the Rwandan Army “To place clandestine individuals among the civilian population in areas where they can ambush and kill the morale of rebel forces (RPF)”. This is the idea of using the army clandestinely or using civilians in acts of war.

In February 1992, the civil defense program begun in the north and ended in the east. The program had over a period of time been a subject of discussion among Rwandans before its launch. The head of the French Army in Kigali, Colonel Cussac, closely monitored the program. A committee of French parliamentarians which was put into place in order for it to study the role of France in the Genocide (Mission d'information parlementaire francaise) publicized a section of the letter (telex diplomatique) of 22nd January 1992 in which Colonel Cussac explained in detail the program to supply civilians with arms as mentioned above. He mentioned the respective regions, the method of choosing those who shall be part of the program, and also emphasizing the number of arms:300. He also mentioned that most of the arms were MAS 36 and he also indicated his reservations on the possible outcome of the program. Varying independent witnesses firmly testified that the French army requested burgomasters for volunteers in order to train them; they agreed to supply them with arms for future groupings; they agreed to supply tools, to supervise the training and to also conduct some of the trainings.

Training of the Interahamwe militiamen in five military camps occupied by French soldiers. French soldiers trained and contributed to military training of Interahamwe between the beginning of 1992 until the departure of the *Noroît* operation in December 1993. This training was carried out in five large military camps where French soldiers were established. After the Bugesera massacres of March 1992, which were closely covered by colonel Robardey, the French Army knew that Interahamwe that they trained had for principal mission the massacres of Tutsis, vocation which was confirmed later in time. The French gendarme of elite Thierry Prungnaud during an interview granted to France Culture on April 22nd, 2005 formally confirms training of Interahamwe by French soldiers: « *There are trainings which had also been granted to civil mercenaries on the occasion of courses that I carried out with my trainees, where I saw French soldiers training civil Rwandan militiamen in shooting. That was done for several times, but the only time where I saw them, there was perhaps about thirty militiamen who were trained in shooting in the park of Akagera.* » French soldiers fully took part in the intensification of the training of Interahamwe during the last quarter of 1993. This intensification belonged to preparations of genocide.

Contribution to electronic pointing and the making of lists of Tutsi and suspect political opponents. French gendarmes contributed to the pointing of Tutsi and the political opponents. French gendarmes appointed to the CRCD introduced the computerization of the service database, in particular the file of the people to be traced and investigated (PRAS). On October 14, 1992, lieutenant-colonel Michel Robardey wrote to Chief of staff of the National Gendarmerie, **Colonel Augustin Ndidiliyimana**: « according to your directive, I have the honour to submit to you an electronic filing system where you will easily trace people meant to be investigated. This project was prepared and carried out by a task force involving the Gendarmes working together with the national intelligence service (CRCD). *This computer system is now operational and the personnel to manage it have been trained. It will no longer be necessary for a single soldier to carry out the laborious task looking for files. This system shall enable you to be in direct contact with solders at the battle field. What remains is your authorisation to enable us start the system.* Colonel Ndidiliyimana responded to this letter on October 28 1992, with the following words: “*1/Following Lt-Col ROBARDEY letter dated October 14, 1992 informing me that what remains for the computerised system to commence is my authorisation, I hereby inform you that the authorisation is given.* 2/ *I request you to train the personnel in the Judicial Police and other military camps in order to exploit this system.* »^[9] General Jean Varret, who was in charge of co-operation in the army between October 1990 and April 1993 is the one who initiated this project wherein France considerably helped the National Intelligence Service. When summoned in 1998 before the Committee of Deputies in charge of the investigating the role of France in the Rwandan genocide, he affirmed that he was convinced that French gendarmes were helping the National Intelligence Service of Rwanda in preparation of the lists of Tutsis to be killed.

On the question raised by Deputy Bernard Cazeneuve to General Jean Varret *whether it was true that the goal of the Rwandan Government in training senior legal police officers was to prepare a list of Tutsis, the General replied that he was convinced to that effect and further informed the committee that he had done everything in his means to stop that military co-operation with the Rwandan gendarmerie (...)* » ^[10]

Before April 1994, many people were selected and later on killed while others were arrested from their residences or at road blocks. At the beginning of the genocide, Rwandan soldiers moved from house to house killing political opponents and distinguished Tutsis who had been enrolled on the computerised list. The gendarmerie, as an institution, had sent many of its personnel to the countryside and equipped them with necessary logistics to collect information. Additionally, it had a computer program prepared and given to them by the French gendarmes. A former agent of the Central Intelligence Service of Rwanda affirmed to the Rwandan Commission that never had his institution reached the degree of organization in comparison to that the gendarmerie had due to the French cooperation. Thus, there is a strong possibility that the lists that were used in the beginning of the genocide were drawn up with the assistance of the computer system.

France's role in the execution of the genocide

Appointment of Colonel Bagosora as the successor to president Habyarimana.

On April 7th, 1994 the French ambassador in Rwanda Marlaud together with Colonel Jean-Jacques Maurin went to meet Colonel Bagosora and asked him to take charge of the situation. During this time of crisis, the French ambassador had so much influence on Rwanda's politics to the extent that he would install or remove anyone.

However, it should be remembered that one year before replacing Habyarimana, Colonel Bagosora had remarked that he is going to "prepare an apocalypse". After the installation of the interim government, a coalition that was based on Hutu-power, the French ambassador went further and gave it blessings.

Besides, what was well known about Colonel Bagosora and most of the coalition members was their zeal to eliminate what they referred to as accomplices to RPF in the country, all Tutsis and Hutus who did not believe in the Hutu-power ideology.

Colonel Bagosora was regarded as an architect of the genocide while the interim government was an avenue to implement the genocide. Colonel Bagosora and many others who composed the interim government have since been convicted or are undergoing trial at the ICTR. Their positions were well known even before the genocide.

Diplomatic and military support to the interim government while openly committing genocide.

At all times during the genocide, France diplomatically and militarily assisted the interim government which planned and implemented the genocide to the watch of the whole world. On April 27, 1994, i.e. three weeks after the start of the genocide, two delegates of that interim government, **Jerome Bicamumpaka**, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and **Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza**, one of the CDR leaders, were hosted in Paris at the *Champs Elysées* (President's office) and *Matignon (Foreign Ministry's office)*, while countries like the United States and Belgium had refused to grant them visas^[11]. They had discussions with high French officials, in particular Prime Minister **Edouard Balladur**, Foreign Affairs Minister **Alain Juppé**, and **Bruno Delaye**, the Head of the African Unit at the President's office^[12].

On May 9th, 1994, General Huchon hosted Lieutenant-Colonel **Ephrem Rwabalinda**, adviser to the chief of staff of ex- FAR. During their talks, the two officers discussed urgent matters that needed "priority" in implementation: « - *the support to Rwanda by France in the field of international politics; - the physical presence of French soldiers in Rwanda [...] for help and assistance in the framework of co-operation; - the possibility of indirect use of foreign troops; [...]* »^[13]

General Huchon committed France to provide ammunition in the category of 105mm, individual arms and other ammunition as well as communication equipment to facilitate secret communication with General Augustin Bizimungu, commander in chief of the ex-FAR. This aimed at facilitating a direct military intervention of France in Rwanda.

Delivery of arms and ammunition during the genocide by France.

The first information on delivery of arms to the governmental side by France appears with the very beginning of the genocide at the time of the Amaryllis operation which came to evacuate French nationals and foreigners. Belgian **Colonel Luc Marshall**, commander of the Kigali sector in UNAMIR, who was the source of this information, confirms this to *the World* newspaper in the following terms:

"We were informed, on 8th [April 1994], that French planes would land the following day around 6 a.m. Actually, they arrived at 3 h45. Obviously, there was a coordination between the French and the Rwandans. The vehicles which blocked the runway were withdrawn in middle of the night. I was not personally at the airport, but I had observers there of" fifteen different nationalities. They were soldiers, and they knew what they were saying. Some were formal: cases of ammunition - probably 5 tons - were discharged from a plane and were transported by vehicles of the Rwandan army in its camp of Kanombe which was used as support to the presidential guard. »^[14]

Then, information giving a report on supply of weapons by France during the genocide is centered around the airport of Goma, small Zairian city located at less than five kilometers from the Rwandan border. Here are some principal information about the question:

- Philippe Jehanne, old agent of the secret service serving at the office of the minister of Co-operation, declares on May 19th, 1994 with Gerard Prunier: « *We deliver ammunition to the FAR while passing by Goma. But of course we will contradict if you quote me in the press* »^[15].
- « *In May, more than one month after the beginning of massacres and whereas 10.000 people had been killed in Gisenyi [very close to Goma], the French let unloaded a cargo of weapons at Goma in Zaire. While the smell of corpses piled up in a common grave at the border was invading the airport, the weapons for murderers were piled up on the runway. France Consul at Goma said that he was not in the position to intervene: the matter was about a private contract execution, signed before the prohibition of sale of weapons to Rwanda.* »^[16]
- On May 31st, 1994, *Humanity* newspaper refers to a letter of May 25th of the embassy of Rwanda in Cairo to the Rwandan Minister of Defense, **Augustin Bizimana**, announcing him the deliveries of weapons to the FAR by France via Zaire to which they were wrongly addressed .
- On June 4th, 1994, Stephen Smith reports that a Boeing 707 delivered at the Goma airport weapons paid by France.

« *Lastly, since the beginning of the Rwandan tragedy, the airport of Goma is the **back base** of the neighboring country's government, Rwanda. It is there that the genocide authors got supplies, mainly in weapons for ten days. Since the rout of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) in Kigali, on Sunday May 22nd, "special flights" to Goma indeed ceased. Previously, at five times, a 707 Boeing with a carefully omitted registration had landed three times in daytime and twice during night. Its cargo: each time some 18 tons of weapons and ammunition of "Serb origin" according to certain people, in boxes stamped "Bulgaria", according to others. At least once, witnesses affirm to have identified South-African pilots. In spite of the expansion of details and contradictory versions, all the available sources - including well placed French expatriates - express their "certainty" that these deliveries of weapons "were paid by France". Nobody, is able to support by a material evidence this assertion.* »^[17]

- *La Lettre du Continent* of June 16, 1994 indicates that: « *On June 21st, 1994 [...] A few days earlier, colonel Good Domenica, military attaché at the embassy of France in Kinshasa, has more or less recognized that deliveries of weapons to the ex-FAR did not cease and that they were passing by the airport of Goma, and it was overall more embarrassing as the airport was supposed to serve for humanitarian purposes.* »

Human Rights Watch organization which conducted an investigation on the delivery of weapons to the genocide forces has also interviewed the French Consul at Goma, Jean-Claude Urbano, who repeated the same information. Human Rights Watch recalls at the same time that any export of weapons from France must receive a governmental approval^[18].

- During the genocide, General Huchon received on several occasions Lieutenant-colonel **Cyprien Kayumba** at the military Cooperation Mission who stayed for 27 days in Paris “ *to try to accelerate the supplies of weapons and ammunition to the Rwandan army* ^[19] ». Kayumba occupied the functions of chief of the logistic services in the Rwandan ministry of Defense and was especially in charge of the purchase of weapons and ammunition. He was a member of the crisis committee set up by Bagosora on April 7th, 1994. From the Rwandan embassy in Paris, Kayumba carried out negotiations on transfers and purchases of weapons to supply the FAR. In July 1994, Kayumba drew up a report of his mission in France which he transmitted to his hierarchical seniors, via the Rwandan embassy in Paris. He evoked six deliveries of weapons of an amount of 5.454.395 dollars, organized with the assistance from two companies, DLY-Invest (France) and Millet-tec (the United Kingdom) between on April 19 and on July 18, 1994^[20]. After the defeat of the FAR, Kayumba would have been suspected of money embezzlement, and in his explanation letter addressed to **Theodore Sindikubwabo**, he revealed to have loaded six (6) planes, which *is 240 Tons of ammunition* ^[21] ”.
- Lastly, documents found in the Mugunga refugee camp after the flight of the Rwandan refugees following the attack of the camp by the new Rwandan governmental troops accuse two French part government-owned companies in orders of weapons; these companies, SOFREMAS and Luchaire would have delivered weapons to the FAR during the genocide and after the embargo issued by the Security Council.^[22]

Part of the weapons was directly delivered to Interahamwe of Gisenyi, Kibuye and Cyangugu for massacres of civilian Tutsis far away from the military operations area.

The French Army, legitimate occupying force, is responsible for the continuation of genocide operations in its “Humanitarian Safe Zone”

In June 1994, when the FAR were about to be defeated by the RPF, President Mitterrand decided to intervene militarily in Rwanda through launching the *Turquoise* operation. The first objective of this intervention was to divide the country in two starting from Kigali, to stop the advancing of RPF and to oblige it to negotiate the power-sharing with the genocide government. But when *Turquoise* arrived to Rwanda at the end of June 1994, it was too late because RPF had far advanced.

In France, on the occasion of pre-deployment “briefing”, the French military commanding reversed the reality of the genocide by explaining to its soldiers that it was the Tutsis who massacred the Hutus. The gendarme Thierry Prugnaud explains that “ *The*

mission in the beginning was to intervene on so-called massacres of Hutus who would be massacred by Tutsis, and upon arriving at the place, we realized after some fifteen days that it was completely the opposite, it was the Hutus killing the Tutsis. »

Continuation of operations and collaboration with the genocide political and logistical infrastructure in the *Turquoise Zone*. Establishment of facts and their analysis show in a clear way that colonel Rosier, chief of the first phase of deployment of *Turquoise* in Rwanda deliberately sacrificed survivors of Bisesero by well knowing that they were being intensively massacred between the 27 and 30 of June, 1994. The Bisesero case was not only terrible but also highlighted the global strategy of the *Turquoise* Operation. The analysis of the *Turquoise* work in the three prefectures it covered, namely Cyangugu, Kibuye and Gikongoro shows clear recurrences, making it possible to distinguish a policy.

Upon their arrival, French soldiers hastened to secure certain enclaves like camps of genocide survivors at Nyarushishi or, later, Murambi, with great publicity. In addition, in the remainder of the area, they collaborated with prefecture, commune and local administrative authorities who organized the Tutsi population extermination. They left in place the genocide infrastructures, namely road blocks held by Interahamwe. They clearly requested Interahamwe to continue patrolling these road blocks and to kill Tutsis moving around. They also clearly requested to have Tutsi who had infiltrated in displaced population camps brought to them and have Interahamwe kill at least some of them. At different places in the three prefectures, they let Interahamwe kill Tutsi under their eyes. Lastly, French soldiers themselves directly were involved in assassinations of Tutsis and Hutus accused of hiding Tutsis. French soldiers committed many rapes, forced sexual intercourse specifically with survivor tutsi women. These sexual abuses targeting particularly survivor tutsi women were systematic, i.e., frequent, tolerated and generated by standards and practices of the institution to which the men who committed them belonged. The deplorable, in particular food conditions, in which the survivors of the genocide were living assisted by French soldiers, either in the finally established camp at Bisesero, Nyarushishi or Murambi, obliged once again survivors to risk their life by leaving the “protected” enclaves to seek for food, caused the death of some of them. The refusal of care to women and girls at Kibuye and Cyangugu by certain French army medical officers, as well as abusive amputations at Goma. These facts show that there was aggression of French soldiers against inoffensive Tutsi survivors, due to the only fact of their ethnic belonging. These facts occurred all along the period of the *Turquoise* operation, i.e. June 23rd to August 22nd 1994.

Encouraging people to a massive flight of the country. Be it at Gikongoro, Kibuye or Cyangugu, during the last days of their presence, French soldiers practised the scorched earth policy. They simultaneously ordered in the three prefectures to the local authorities to encourage the Hutu population to flee massively to Zaire. French senior officers

holding commanding positions held public meetings inciting the population to flee the country. Colonel Sartre organized a great public meeting on July 13th, 1994 at Rubengera during which he strongly encouraged the population to flee to Zaire by promising the assistance of France for a very urgent armed return to Rwanda. in little time. This French stimulus to massively flee the country is the origin of a terrible humanitarian crisis which struck Rwandan refugees in Zaire in July 1994. Lastly, during the last days of their mission, French soldiers encouraged plundering and destruction of public infrastructures; they also took part in it. French soldiers accompanied the ex-FAR and Interahamwe in Zaire where they immediately assisted them, by military trainings and deliveries of arms and ammunition, to prepare an armed return to Rwanda.

The French Army, occupying force, is the ultimate responsible for slaughters committed in its “humanitarian safe zone”. During the *Turquoise* operation, the assumption of responsibility of the genocide project by French decision makers was more directly visible. When on July 6th, 1994, France received the agreement of the United Nations Secretary General to create the “Humanitarian Safe Zone” (HSZ), , it became an occupying power in that zone, and thus was the only one holding authority. The HSZ is in fact a “zone of safety”, a portion of territory placed “under the proper authority of a belligerent or under the authority of the opposing party or allied, on which all arms activities are prohibited and which is intended to shelter threatened people or people at risk. »^[23] These safety zones are envisaged by Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their additional protocols. By creating the HSZ, the French Army assumed the full exercise of authority, excluding any other institution. While deciding to keep and collaborate with the political and administrative personnel, with the henchmen and their infrastructures who had perpetrated the genocide during the preceding two and half months, in asking them and/or letting them continue killings of Tutsis which in that context were constitutive of the crime of genocide, often under their eyes, the *Turquoise* French soldiers and their silent partners fully had in hand the genocide project.

Considering the gravity of the alleged facts, the Rwandan Government enjoins competent authorities to undertake all necessary actions in order to bring the French political and military accused leaders to answer for their acts before the Rwandan justice.

^[1] *Le Figaro*, April 6, 2004.

^[2] Declaration of François Mitterrand to the Council of Ministers, June 22, 1994.

^[3] See “ *France try a mediation between the President and the opposition* ”, (AFP), *Le Monde*, March 2, 1993.

^[4] Gerard Plum tree, “Rwanda: the genocide”, 1999, p. 216-217.

^[5] Testimony collected by the Commission at Kigali, the 14/06/2007.

^[6] French national Parliament, parliamentary Mission of information, *Inquire into the Rwandan tragedy (1990-1994), Rapport, T. I*, version pdf, p. 156. (Thereafter, this reference will be quoted in summary: MIP, *Inquire...*)

^[7] MIP, *Inquire...*, T. II Appendices, version pdf, p.165.

- [8] Letter of lieutenant-colonel Mr. Robardey, technical adviser, “Criminal Investigation Department”, with the Chief of staff of the national gendarmerie.
- [9] Letter of colonel Augustin Ndindiriyimana to the chief of the CRCDD, October 28, 1992.
- [10] Hearing of General Jean Varret MIP, *Inquire...*, T. I, Hearings, flight. 1, pp. 217-223.
- [11] Human Rights Watch, FIDH, “No witness must survive”, p.750.
- [12] *Le Monde*, 1^{er} April 1998.
- [13] The Report/ratio of Rwabalinda can be consulted on the site of Voltaire agency: www.voltairenet.org/article5869.html.
- [14] *Le Monde* from August 23, 1995.
- [15] Gerard Plum tree, 1999, p. 332, note 136.
- [16] *The Economist* begun again by *international Mail* from July 7 1994.
- [17] *Release* June 4, 1994.
- [18] Human Rights Watch, Rwanda/Zaire, *Rearming with Impunity*.
- [19] Human Rights Watch, FIDH, *None witness...* p.770
- [20] Letter of Colonel Cyprien Kayumba to the Minister of Defense at Bukavu, December 26, 1994 (MIP, Volume II, Appendices, p.563); *Le Monde*, 1st April 1998;
- [21] *Ibid*.
- [22] *Humanity* from November 20, 1996.
- [23] Antoine Mindua,